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LABOR LA w - COLLECTIVE BARGAINING - ENFORCEABILITY OF COLLEC'llVE 
AGREEMENTS UNDER SECTION 301 (a) - Plaintiff, an unincorporated labor 
organization, filed suit in federal district court to enforce a collective bar-
gaining agreement with defendant. The complaint alleged that defendant 
was obligated by the agreement to pay employees represented by the plain-
tiff their full salary for the month of April 1951 regardless of the fact that 
they had been absent on certain working days. The suit was brought 
under section 301 (a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.1 
l 61 Stat. L. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §185. 
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On appeal from a court of appeals decision directing dismissal for lack 
of jurisdiction, held, affirmed, two justices dissenting. An action by a labor 
organization to enforce terms of a collective bargaining agreement which 
are peculiar in the individual benefit which is their subject matter and 
which, when violated, give a cause of action to the individual employee 
is not within the jurisdiction of the federal courts as conferred by the 
Labor-Management Relations Act. Association of Westinghouse Salaried 
Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 75 S. Ct. 488 
(1955). 
The principal case is significant both for the narrow construction it 
places upon section 301 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act and because it repre-
sents the first Supreme Court discussion of the constitutionality of that 
provision. The constitutional problem stems from the fact that although 
section 301 (a) purports to allow suits in the federal district courts to 
enforce collective bargaining agreements by or against labor unions, the 
substantive rules to govern in such actions are not provided. According 
to the majority opinion, this raises some doubt as to whether actions under 
section 301 (a) can be sustained as cases "arising under" the Constitution 
or laws of the United States.2 Considering only the language of article III 
of the Constitution, one would be reluctant to conclude that a case arises 
under federal law solely because Congress has provided that the district 
courts shall have jurisdiction.3 However, federal question jurisdiction has 
been sustained on somewhat broader grounds than the constitutional 
language would appear to authorize4 and it is still likely that the constitu-
tionality of section 301 (a) may be upheld.5 The power of Congress to 
regulate commerce undoubtedly embraces the power to provide substantive 
rules to govern the formation and interpretation of collective bargaining 
agreements in an industry affecting commerce. Moreover, Congress, in 
2 U.S. CONST., art. III, §2. In connection with this problem see 57 YALE L. J. 630 
(1948); Forrester, "The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Labor Disputes," 13 LAW AND 
CONTEM. PROB. 114 (1948); 17 A.L.R. (2d) 614 (1951). On "federal question" jurisdic-
tion in general see Mishkin, "The Federal Question in the District Courts," 53 CoL. 
L. REv. 157 (1953); Wechsler, "Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial 
Code," 13 LAw AND CONTEM. PROB. 216 (1948). 
3 In Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 57 S.Ct. 96 (1936), Justice Cardozo 
indicated that "a suit to enforce a right which takes its origin·in the laws of the United 
States is not necessarily, or for that reason alone, one arising under those laws, for a 
suit does not so arise unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or contro-
versy respecting the validity, construction or effect of such a law, upon the determina-
tion of which the result depends.'' Although this was said in construing a statutory 
grant of jurisdiction, the language used in that grant was the same as that appearing 
in article III and Cardozo indicated that his interpretation would also apply to the 
constitutional language. 
4 "Federal incorporation" was used as a basis for sustaining jurisdiction in Osborn 
v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 737 (1824), though the law to be 
applied was state law. And in Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 55 S.Ct. 230 (1934), 
suits by a trustee in bankruptcy were sustained as presenting a federal question, even 
where, again, state law was to be applied. 
5 See the articles' cited in note 2 supra. 
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lieu of formulating those substantive rules itself, could constitutionally 
declare the existence of a federal substantive right to enforce these con-
tracts and leave to the courts the task of formulating, from state or federal 
law, the specific rules to be applied.6 Under these circumstances, it is 
likely that the court will "imply" a federal substantive right to enforce 
these collective agreements.7 
Of more immediate importance, however, is the restrictive interpreta-
tion placed by the Court upon the scope of section 301 (a). Justice Frank-
furter, speaking for the majority, purports to justify this interpretation on 
the grounds that (1) the serious constitutional problem will be avoided 
and (2) Congress did not intend to open the federal courts to the "flood 
of grievances" which would result if the present action were allowed.8 
When two possible constructions of a congressional enactment are avail-
able, one of which is clearly valid and the other of doubtful constitution-
ality, there may be some basis for adopting the former on the theory, 
however fictional, that Congress intended to do what it lawfully could do. 
But the effect of this method of construction in the principal case is not 
to sustain an act of Congress but merely to postpone consideration of its 
constitutionality. It is doubtful if the premise for the "flood of litigation" 
argument is a valid one, either, for the advantages of "speed, economy, 
justice and privacy" have increasingly led parties to favor settlement by 
arbitration over resort to the courts.9 Even assuming the validity of the 
premise, however, the answer is that Congress was aware of this argument10 
and enacted section 301 (a) in spite of it. Nor does the conceptual ap-
proach of Justice Reed's concurring opinionfil seem adequate to sustain 
the result reached. Although the employer's acts were a violation of the 
employees' individual hiring contracts, they were equally a breach of the 
collective agreement and nothing in the language of section 301 (a) suggests 
a differentiation. Thus, none of the arguments advanced in favor of the nar-
row construction effectively sustain such an interpretation. As the dissenting 
6 Justice Reed suggests that in such a case state law is "incorporated by reference." 
Principal case at 463. The majority opinion also recognizes that Congress could have 
authorized the federal courts to formulate the substantive rules to govern in §301 
actions but concludes that they did not intend to do so. Principal case at 443. 
7 This has been the rationale used in the lower courts to sustain the constitutionality 
of §301. Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, (D.C. N.Y. 1949) 83 F. Supp. 
162; Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co. v. United Furniture Workers of America, (D.C. 
Md. 1948) 76 F. Supp. 493. See 57 YALE L. J. 630 (1948). 
s Principal case at 460. 
9 Kaye and Allen, "Union Responsibility and the Enforcement of Collective Bargain-
ing Agreements," 30 Bosr. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 1 at 16, 26 (1950). 
10 See the minority report of Senator Thomas, S. Rep. 105, part II, 80th Cong., 1st 
sess.,, p. 13 (1947). 
11 Justice Reed's position is that there was no breach of the collective bargaining 
agreement so as to confer jurisdiction under §301, but rather a breach of the employees' 
individual hiring contracts. The results reached under this view, however, will probably 
not vary significantly from those which would be reached under the position taken 
in the majority opinion. 
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op1mon points out, one of the policies underlying the National Labor 
Relations Act was the desire to promote industrial stability by encouraging 
the peaceful settlement of disputes. Accordingly, it was recognized that 
the collective bargaining relation between employee and union ought not 
to end with the negotiation of the collective agreement.12 Section 301 (a) 
was enacted in furtherance of this policy18 and ought to be interpreted in 
the same spirit. This being true, a sounder construction would be one 
which leads to greater enforceability of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.14 At least one would seem justified in expecting more convincing 
reasons to justify a departure from what the language of the provision 
clearly seems to contemplate. 
Douglas Peck, S.Ed. 
12 Two examples of this treatment, both cited in Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion, 
may be noted: (1) under §8 (d) the employer and the representative of the employees 
have a duty to bargain "with respect to • . . terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder." 61 Stat. L. 142 
(1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158 (d) (italics added) and (2) although the individual em• 
ployee's right to present his own grievance is recognized the union must be given the 
opportunity to be present at the adjustment of that grievance. 61 Stat. L. 143 (1947), 
29 U.S.C. (1952) §159 (a). 
1 3 The primary concern of the legislators appears to have been the elimination of 
the difficulty involved in bringing suits against labor unions. The provision was also 
intended to promote stability during the lifetime of these collective agreements by 
making them "equally binding and enforceable on both parties." S. Rep. 105, 80th 
Cong., 1st sess., p. 15. (1947). 
14 In this connection, Justice Frankfurter's contention that the rationale of the court 
of appeals decision in the instant case is repugnant to the policy of the National Labor 
Relations Act would seem to be equally applicable to his own position, since the argu-
ment involves an admission that, even as to grievances involving one employee· or· a few 
employees, the union has a legitimate interest in enforcing the collective agreement. 
Principal case at 456. 
